

Praja Parishad Agitation (1952-53), Its Reactions and Crisis of August 1953

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Praja Parishad Agitation (1952-53), Its Reactions and Crisis of August 1953

Dr. Vidya Bhushan*

The all Jammu and Kashmir Praja Parishad, being essentially a reaction to the aggressive trends in the local nationalism of Kashmir, a protest of a region which felt politically ignored and condemned¹, result of regional nationalism, a regional and a largely Hindu dominated party was found² in 1947. Hindu Dogras had a sense of insecurity as a minority community in the State. Representing their apprehensions, Praja Parishad sought security in the retention of the Institution of the Maharaja as a Constitutional head of the State. For the same reason they favoured closer ties between the State and Indian Union and abrogation of Article 370 which conferred a Special Status on the State. It rejected, outrightly a separate Consensus,³ separate emblem and separate flag for the state and the institution of Sadar-i-Rayasat and demanded the application of Indian Constitution in its entirety.⁴ Like Jana Sangh, its policy too was influenced by the ideology of AKHAND BHART and regarded the accession of

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1 Puri, Balraj : *Jammu A clue to Kashmir Tangle*. A-4, Model Town Delhi-9, 1966 pp 33-34.

2 Bate, Craig. : *The Jana Sangh*, University of Pennsylvania Press Philadelphia 1969. p-75,

"According to Craig Baxter," The Praja Parishad was founded in November 1947, in Jammu and like Jana Sangh was built on R. S. S. base. The First President was *Hari Wazir* and the Gen. Secy was *Madhok*. Wazir was succeeded by Lala Roop Chand Nanda. Nanda was arrested in 1949. The Parishad began an agitation against the Government headed by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah which was withdrawn when Abdullah agreed to release Nanda. Nanda resigned the Presidency and withdrew from Political Activity. His successor as President was Pt. Prem Nath Dogra."

3 *Jammu Rejects A Separate Constitution for J&K State*. A pamphlet published by the All J&K Praja Parishad, year unknown.

4 *Ibid*.

the State to the Union as final, complete, legally valid and beyond question.⁵ The Party believed in the concept of India as a strong Unitary State.⁶

The Party which had previously criticised the convening of Consimply to draft separate constitution for the State, decided to contest the elections and demanded representation in Delimitation Committee.⁷ Soon after the party leadership charged the National Conference and its Government of commission of malafide tactics,⁸ number of irregularities⁹ and dubious methods¹⁰ in Jammu Elections and gave an ultimatum¹¹ and ultimately boycotted the elections under protest.¹² This gave rise to the Prashid war cry :

Ek Drsh men do Vidha—In one country two Constitutions ;

Ek Desh men do Nishan—In one country two Flags ;

Ek Desh men do Pradhan—In one country two Prime Ministers.

Nahin Chalengay ! Nahin Chalengay—Will not be tolerated¹³ ;

5 Programme—Apamplet published by the All J&K Praja Parshid Jammu, year unknown pl.

6 Deendayal Upadhaya, Presidential Address, Calicut, December 1967,

7 The Hindustan Times, 9th May 1951,

8 A Statement issued by Pt. Prem Nath Dogra, at a press conference held in New Delhi on 6th Oct. 1951. Praja Parshid Files, Jana Sangh office, Jammu,

(ii) Praja Parishad stand Explained—A Pamphlet issued by Durga Dass Verma, General Secretary. The all J&K Praja Parshid, Jammu year unknown, pp-8-14.

(iii) A plea to understand Praja prashid—A pamphlet issued by publicity secretary. The all J&K praja parshid-p-8.

9 A Statement issued by Pt. Prem Nath Dogra—to the press at Delhi on 6th October, 1951, mentioned the adoption of the following irregularities:—1. Not holding elections in the provinces of Kashmir and Jammu simultaneously ; 2. Irregular Delimitation ; 3. No general seat in three Constitutencies ; 4. Out of the way polling stations ; 5. 41 out of 65 nominations of praja parishid candidates being rejected on most flimsy grounds ; 6. Favour towards the National Conference Candidates ; and 7. Official interference.

10 The General Secretary of All J&K Praja Parshid in a letter to State Election Commission. dated 5th October 1951 made similar complaints. pp, Fils, Jammu Office.

11 Resolution adopted by working committee of all J&K Praja Parshid dated 22nd Sept. 1951, Jana Sangh Files, Jammu Office.

12 A Telegram to Prime Minister of India—dt. 9th Oct. 1951. Jana Sangh Files, Head Office, Jammu.

13 Madhok/Balraj : Kashmir Centre of New Alignment : Deepak Parkasha New Delhi-1963, p-24.

A minor incident over the protest of a few students against hoisting of National Conference Flag in G.G.M. College on 15th January 1962¹⁵ touched off the conflagration. The incident led to penalisation of the students¹⁶ Students' hunger strike,¹⁷ violence,¹⁸ Police Lathi charge, firing,¹⁹ partial paralisation of administrative machinery in Jammu city, intervention of the Military and imposition of 72 hours curfew²⁰ Under its cover, the entire leadership of Praja Parishad was arrested as the Government charged that the demonstration was organised and inspired by the Praja Parishad. There was a sharp reaction in the State as well as rest of India.²¹ On the intervention of Mr.N G. Ayyangar, the then Minister of State of India, who visited Jammu in April 1952 to study the situation and cool passions,²² they were released. But it left trail of bitterness

Meanwhile Mirza Mohd. Afzal Beg, the then Chairman of the Basic Principles Committee pointed out in the Constituent Assembly on March 24, 1952. that the State of Jammu and Kashmir would be "an autonomous Republic within the Indian Union, with a separate President, National Assembly, Judiciary, Regional Autonomy and separate citizenship."²³ Beg's statement was deeply resented not only in Jammu but also in Ladakh and rest of India and created serious apprehensions about the credibility of the leaders of Kashmir.

Regional discontent was also growing in Ladakh. In a memorandum submitted to the State Prime Minister Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah, Kaushak Bakula, Head Lama of Ladakh and member of the Constituent Assembly,

14 *The Jammu Disturbances* : Feb. 1952, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, J&K Govt., year unknown, p-1.

15 *The Jammu Disturbances* ; Feb. 1952. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting J&K, year unknown, p-1.

16 *The Hindu*, (Madras) 5th March 1952.

17 *A case for An open Enquiry* publicity Deptt., the All J&K praja paishad, year unknown p-1.

18 *The Tribune* Dt 11-2-1952,

19 *Ibid*.

20 *The press note* Issued by J&K Govt. on 9-2-1952,

21 i) The Resolution of the working committee of Akhal Bharaliya Hindu Maha Sabha of its, 2nd March 1952. ii) Shri Shibban Lal Sexena's speech in parliament on March 3rd, 1952.

22 *The Hindustan time* of 10th April, 1952.

23 C.A. Deb. vol. II No. 1 of 23-2-1952 pp 3-4

demanding for a statutory provision in the future Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir under which State's North-Eastern Frontier Province of Ladakh covering Slnkiang and Western Tibet, would become a federation unit of Kashmir as long as the accession of the State to India endures". He urged that a separate Legislative Assembly of 15 members, with an Executive Council responsible to it, should be set up for Ladakh to run the internal administration of the area. He pointed out that under that proposal Ladakh would largely bear the same relation to the J&K State as the latter did to India. Asserting that under the circumstances Ladakh would have little or no voice in the State's 75-member Constituent Assembly where it was, in point of race, language and culture a perfect stranger to the rest of the members. He claimed that his plan was the best guarantee of the stability of the connections, of Ladakh with Kashmir. In case his plan was not deemed feasible, he added, then a committee of 10 members elected on the joint electorate basis be set up for Ladakh and no measure affecting the economic, political and religious life of the province be passed by the State Constituent Assembly or the J&K Government without its approval; all proposals emanating from the Statutory Advisory Committee be treated as the "Voice of Ladakh".²⁴

Kushak Bukola had a talk with N.G. Ayyengar and repeated the demand that Ladakh be granted internal autonomy. Kashmiri leaders did not take kindly to these regional protests and were particularly provoked by the merger movement of Praja Parishid. Strongly reacting to the Praja Parishad movement Sheikh Abdullah, in a sensational speech at RS pura on the 10th April 1952, said that Kashmir's accession to India would be of restrictive nature and those who wanted Kashmir to lose its separate identity were talking without any conception of political realities that faced them.²⁵ In another speech at Hazratbal on 18th April, 1952, he said that Kashmir is in no way were prepared to renounce their cherished identity in furtherance of which they had offered blood and sweat during the two decades, Kashmir had acceded to India in respect of only three subjects-Defence, External Affairs and Communication and had the right to shape their destiny according to the wishes of the people.²⁶ In another speech at Hazaratbal

²⁴ *The Statesman* dt 25-3-1952,

²⁵ *The Statesman* dt 12-4-1952.

²⁶ *The Hindustan Times* of 26-4-1952

on 25th April, 1953 he said that the whole world was aware of their policy that the Consenbly would decide three important issues : framing of the Constitution, the future of the ruling dynasiy and the accession of the State.²⁷ These speeches caused an uproar in Jammu particularly and the Indian Press²⁸ and public opinion²⁹ was also agitated.

Meanwhile events were moving fast with in the State. The Consenbly unanimously adopted the State Flag.³⁰ the interim report recommending the abolition of hereditary monarchy and the election of the Head of the State was also unanimously approved³¹

Pt. Prem Nath Dogra said that the decisions of the Consenbly were narrow-sighted and ill-conceived and reflecting one party's ideology that solely comprised the Consenbly. He added that these pronocutive decisions had caused deep resentment, throughout and particularly in the Jammu province.³² While condemning such decisions, the Praja Parishad pointed out that the people of Jammu be made to cry for self-determination and that the will of the Kashmir valley people could not be forced on the people living outside it.³³ A campaign was then started throughout Jammu province to get 5 lacs of signatures in support of the Memorandum to the President of India.³⁴

Officially, a deputation³⁵ of Kashmiri leaders was summoned in Delhi on 12-6-1952³⁶ and held a series of discussion. Sheikh Mohd, Abdullah also joined them on July, 1952³⁷. All this resulted in Delhi Agreement, 1952³⁸. The Praja parishad was of the view that Agreement was another surrender at the alter of communal intransigence and separation of Sheikh Mohd.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ *Indian Express* dt 15-4-1952.

²⁹ Speech of Sh. N. C. Chatterjee M. Z. in The house of people dl 20-5-1952.

³⁰ C A Deb. vol. III No, 1 dt. 7-6-1952 p. 29.

³¹ C.A. Deb. vol. III dt 12-6-1952.

³² A Statement issued by Pt. P.N. Dogra, president of all &K praja parishad dt. 12-6-1952

³³ *Jammu rejects* a separate consitution for the J&K State, praja parishad Jammu year unknown p 14.

³⁴ *The Statesman* dt 2nd July, 1952.

³⁵ *The Times of India* dt. 23-6-1952.

³⁶ *Delhi Express* dt, 27to July, 1952.

³⁷ *Delhi Express* dt. 18th July 1952.

³⁸ Lord Bird Wood : Two Nations and Kashmir p. 28.

Abudllal "A Fraud on India people and an Attack on Indian Aonstitution.³⁹ Pt. Prem Nath Dogra declared that Praja Parishad would launch a Satyag-arch if the Agreement was enforced.⁴⁰

The Parishad movement caused an adverse reaction in Doda District of Jammu also. A section of its inhabitants led by Goni being much agitated,⁴¹ emphasised that if they had peculiar local problems⁴² and historically, geographically,⁴³ culturally⁴⁴ were quite different from their neighbouring unit, they could not in any way be attached with the cultura [unil of Jammu.⁴⁵ While stressing that it must be given the status of a separate cultural unit⁴⁶ like Jammu and Ladakh, they demanded the State to be divided into as many as five cultural units...Kashmri, Jammu, Poonch, Rajouri, Ladakh and Doda⁴⁷ in the future constitutional setup of J&K State. Each such unit, legally, having equal status should enjoy autonomy in the conduct of their internal affairs including maintenance of law and order within their own limits.⁴⁸

The regional tension is also supposed to have provoked prominent Kashmiri leader Mr. G. M Karra to form the first secessionist party, Poilitical Conference, in Kashmir after 1947.

The State Government lost no time in implementing those provisions of the agreement which aimed at autonomy. Monarchy was abolished,⁴⁹ and Yuvaraj Karan Singh was elected as Sadar-e-Riyast.⁵⁰ Sheikh Abdullah was accused of ignoring those sections which confirmed Kashmir's ties with India⁵¹ and provided coustitutional safeguard for Jammu and Ladakh as agreed by him. Meanwhile differences spread in his Cabinet and the working committee in regard to the interpret-

39 *Nehru Abdullah pact the unholy Agreement and Fraud* p.p. Jammu pp. 2-3.

40 *The Organiser* (weekly) vol VI No. 11 dt. 27 October, 1952.

41 Goni, Abdul Ghani : *Doda District*, pamphlet, Doda dt. 21 July 1953.

42 *Ibid* p. 7.

43 *Ibid* p. 7.

44 *Ibid* p. 6

45 *Ibid* p. 10.

46 *Ibid* pp. and 10.

47 *Ibid* p. 3

48 *Ibid* p. 11.

49 *C.A. Deb*, vol IV No. V Dt, 21 August, 1952 p. 28,

50 *The Hindustan Standard* 15th Nov., 1952.

51 P.N. Bambzai : *His tory of Kashmi*, Metropolitam Book Company pvt, Ltd. 1st Education-1962 p-722.

ation and implementation of the Delhi Agreement.⁵² But Sheikh Abdullah pointed out that neither he nor the smallest worker of the National Conference had said one word in violation of the Delhi Agreement.⁵²

The Praja Parishad adopted an eight-point programme for Satyagrah⁵³ the details of which were settled by Pt. P N Dogra and Dr. S.P Mukherji at Jullundur during Punjab Jana Singh session on Nov. 8, 1952. On November, 21, Pt. P.N Dogra and Sham Lal were arrested and the agitation started.⁵⁴ The movement assumed serious proportions and its repercussions were felt outside the State also. "Anti Kashmiri feelings in Jammu developed anti-Muslim overtones, while anti-Jammu reactions in the valley tended to become anti-Hindu and hostile to rest of the country."⁵⁵ Finally the three parties of India Jana Sangh, Ram Rajya Parishad and Hindu Maha Sabha merged together in a bid to organise the movement in Delhi proper.⁵⁶ Dr. S.P. Mukherji entered into a long correspondence⁵⁷ with Pt. Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah but nothing substantial came out. At later stage Dr. Mukherji even went to the extent of accepting Delhi-Agreement to withdraw the agitation provided all Praja Parishad workers were released and its leaders were invited to a Conference. But the offer was not responded.

A chain of multiple reactions had followed Sheikh's attitude towards Jammu : The agitation of the Praja Parishad, the role of its sympathetic organisations in India, its reactions in the valley and their counter-reactions in India, the planned process of precipitating a conflict between "Kashmir Nationalism" and "Dogra-Nationalism", and Ladakh and Doda's demand for the internal autonomy had created conditions favourable for the disintegration of the State and disruption of the unity of its people. Moreover, the relations between the two Governments (Government of India and the Government of J&K) and oppos-

52 *Vigil*—A political weekly edited by Manoranjan Guha Delhi vol. iv No 52, Feb, 13 1953 p-5.

53 *Ibid* p-15.

54 *Organiser* vol No VI vol Dt. 22nd Sept, 1952

55 *Ibid*.

56 *Port Election politics of Jammu & Kashmir*—a half turn pamphlet, Author and publisher unknown but printed at Ashoka Aart Press Shehidi chowk, Jammu, found in p. p. old files Jana Sangh Head Office Jammu.

57 Gupta, Joyti Bhushan Dass: *The Jammu & Kashmir*, Martinus Nijhoff the Hague 1968 p. 203.

ition groups in the State further deteriorated. Sheikh Abdullah was prepared to make some concessions to the separatists in Jammu and Ladakh. The Basic Principles Committee of the Constituent Assembly was thus instructed to study the idea of extending autonomy to each province of the State. The State C. A. was therefore, busy in drafting the constitution on a fully Democratic Basis.

The broad outlines had been drawn up and discussed at length by the working committee of National Conference in 2nd week of May 1953.⁵⁸ The committee asserted again that the relationship of the State with Indian Union would be based on the instrument of Accession of 1947, Art 370 and Indo-Kashmir Agreement of 1952. It was further proposed that the State would be divided into five units on cultural and linguistic line, each unit enjoying certain measures of autonomy strictly relating to internal administration.⁵⁹

According to one version the scheme of regional autonomy was on the following lines—"Three provinces, namely Kashmir, Jammu and Poonch--Rajouri were to have each as executive head a council of Ministers responsible to the Provincial Legislatures. As far as Ladakh and Gilgit matters, {they were proposed to be administered by Regional Councils. Authority might be given under the State Constitution to the State Legislatures to increase or decrease the area of these autonomous units or establish new units,"

Broadcasting from Radio Kashmir, Srinagar on April 17th, 1953, the State Prime Minister, Sheikh Mohd Abdullah said,⁶⁰ "We have decided to give autonomy to the different cultural units of the State as will be provided in the Constitution that is being drawn up. This will remove all the fears of domination of one unit over the other and will make for the voluntary union and consolidation of the people of the State."⁶¹

Joseph Karbel defined⁶² the cultural units as "The Valley, Jammu,

58 *Kashmir Affairs*—a bi-monthly vol 2 No 3 Jan.-Feb, 1960 p. 41.

59 *Hindustan Standard-Delhi* 27th May 1955.

60 *Ibid.*

61 *Quomi Awaz (Weekly)* Jammu, July 1974 p. 75-78.

62 *Ibid.*

Gilgit, Ladakh and region consisting of the districts of Mirpur, Rajouri, Poonch and Muzzafrabad."

The idea seemed to be that a measure of autonomy in their internal affairs, would remove the fears of each of these units and would provide a moral natural and noncommunal impetus for a sense of belonging and political participation. Such a sense of belonging alone could effectively counter the appeal for secession in the valley or of communalism in Jammu - "only this can ensure their unity and contribute to the development of a sentiment of genuine Indian Nationhood in this vital part of the country."⁶³

We, thua, find that certain forces within and outside the State interacted and caused some sort of polarisation among the various stand-points. The Jammu interactionists were never completely reconciled to the State's accession to India in the three subjects along the special status of Kashmir under article 370 of the Constitution of India, the Delhi Agreement of 1952 and even the proposal to give autonomy to the different cultural units of the State were unacceptable to the Praja Parishad. Their search for security induced them to agitate for a highly unified Constitution -with one Constitution, one President and one Flag for the whole of the country. The formation of the separate Consambley for the state, its own Sadar-i-Riyasat as the head, a separate emblem and a separate flag were, therefore, connter to their concept of a strong centre.

The stands of even the national-level parties happened to be confused and contributed to uncertainty about the shape of things to come. All this created a sharp reaction and uncertainty in Kashmir.

Pakistan, on the other hand, while taking advantage of this new situation tried to misinterpret the then emerging public opinion on Kashmir as chauvinistic and to exploit the parochial sentiments of the Dogra Nationalism as well as the religious feelings of the Kashmiris. This was intended to intensify their sense of insecurity and to create doubts in their minds as to whether India would stay secularist after Nehru's death.

63 Karbel, Joreph : *Danger in Kashmir*, Princeton University press 1966 p-34.

All this created political instability, suspense, uncertainty and economic stress. There was also an apprehension that the Kashmir leaders might get alienated from the popular support in the valley and therefore they started more assertive attitude.

Under these compelling circumstances Working Committee of the National Conference appointed 8 members committee, in May 1953,⁶⁴ to explore avenues of an honourable settlement of the accession issue⁶⁵ The Sub-Committee, at its final session, held on 9th June 1953 adopted the following proposals as possible alternatives for an honourable and peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan⁶⁶ :-

- a) Overall plebiscite with conditions as detailed in the minutes of the meeting dated 4.6.53.⁶⁷
- b) Independence of the whole state with joint Indo-Pak control of foreign affairs and defence.
- d) Dixon plan with independence for the plebiscite area."

Then followed a period of studied inactivity and deliberate side-tracking of the main issue completing the constitution.⁶⁸

Meanwhile by the sudden death of Dr. S.P. Mukherji, the President of the Akhil Bharatiya Jana Singh and the leader of opposition in the Indian Parliament, on 23rd June, 1953, in detention at Srinagar, the whole of North India was plunged in profound grief and submerged by a kind of anti-Nehru and Anti-Abdullah wave. Praja Parishad refused to believe that death in mysterious circumstances."⁷⁰

But while explaining his innocence in this matter, Sheikh Abdullah pointed out.⁷¹

64 *Most. Election Politics of Jammu & Kashmir* op. cit. p. 8.

65 Gupta Joyti Bhusham Dass ; *The Jammu and Kashmir*, op. cit p. 206,

66 Sheikh-Abdullah-Sadiq Correspondance August to Oct 1956 Mridula Sarabhi 81/48 Chanakyapuri New Delhi (year not mentioned.)

67 *Ibid.*

68 *Ibid.*

69 *A Statement of Shri Durga Dass Verma A General Secretary All J&K Jammu* 25-6-1953

70 Mdahok. Balraj ; *A Story of Bungling in Kashmir*, Young sia publicati ons, New Delhi, year not mentioned p. 115

71 Gundeva. Y. D. : *The Testament of Sheikh Abdullah*, Palit & Plit publishers Dehra Dun, 1974 pp 42-43.

"Dr. Mukherji was a friend of mine and I had a great regard for him. Bakshi Ghulam Mohd held the portfolio of Home Affairs and Shyam Lal Saraf the portfolio of Health and Jails..... I could establish contact with Dr. Mukherji only through them. I did not even get authentic reports about his health from these people and I received the news of his death quite unexpectedly one morning." The rumblings of similar reactions were also heard in the Frontier district of Ladakh.⁷²

Events thereafter followed each other in such rapid succession that one often missed the link between them.

Simultaneously there were inflammatory reports that Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah was thinking to declare Kashmir as Independent, the idea of which was said to be mooted by American Statesmen, Mr. and Mrs. Henderson⁷³ Stevenson, during his visit to Kashmir in May 1953, reportedly promised American support to the move.⁷⁴ Such reports again threatened to disintegrate J&K and to make it a pawn in international power politics.⁷⁵ However, Sheikh Abdullah pointed out that the charge of planning to declare Kashmir independent was completely baseless.⁷⁶ Moreover, when Sadiq Ali and Madhu Limaye during their visit to the State in 1954, "asked the leading spokesmen of the party (National Conference) and the Government, whether they had any documents in their possession which proved that Sheikh was in secret collaboration with Americans for carving out an independent Kashmir valley, they all denied that they had any such documentary proofs."⁷⁶ The tragedy was that Sheikh Abdullah was misunderstood and his urge for maximum autonomy for the State was just taken for independence.

An open rift in the camp of National Conference suddenly developed. In a cabinet of five members only Mirza Mohd. Afzal Beg continued to support Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah who decided to call a meeting of the Working Committee and General Council of the Na-

72 Winer. Myron. *State Politics in India*, Chicago 1968, pp. 220-22.

73 *Vigil* op. cit Feb. 13, 1933 p, 5.

74 Karbel, Joseph ; *Danger in Kashmir* op. cit p. 237.

75 *Crisis in Kashmir Explained*, Lala Rookh publications, Srinagar, year unknown, Introduction portion,

76 Gundeva, Y, O *The Testament of Sheikh Abdullah* op. cite. p. 46.

tional Conference on 24th August and 26th August, 1953 respectively to endorse his new line and desired to make public his latest stand on 21st August, 1953 The Idd Day.⁷⁷

The scene was now complicated enough to climx the tragic drama of Kashmir. On August 7th, 1953, three members of the cabinet led by Bakshi, accused Abdullah in a memorandum, sent to Sadar-Riyasat, of making arbitrary decisions, of being responsible for deterioration in the administration, nepotism, inefficiency and wanton wastage of public resources and alleged that the cabinet had lost the confidence of the people.⁷⁸ Sheikh SAbdullah was summoned by the Sadar-i-Riyasat who suggested an emergency meeting of the cabinet for free and frank discussion at the palace.⁷⁹ But he refused and left for Gulmarg to spend the weekend.⁸

On the other hand, the Congress leadership and the leadership of National Conference in State too, which had an identity in their approaches and objectives in so far as their freedom struggle was concerned and adopted a similarity of views and strategies with regard to the politics of Government in pre independence, were then unable to adjust their political objectives and coordinate their political operations. Underneath the stable political facade there was a marked simmering discontent and disappointment at each other's performance.⁸¹

Thus "many birds were killed with the single stone of dismissal and subsequent arrest of Sheikh Abdullah."⁸² But Sheikh Abdullah's political "martyrdom" on 9th August made him a popular hero of Kashmir once again.

The fateful crisis of 1953 was therefore, logically the result of inter-regional tensions in particularly represented by Praja Parishad agitation of 1952-53, the motivational variations arising out of varied political considerations and failure of National leadership at various levels to reconcile divergent regional and Kashmir aspirations and claims as well the demands of national interests.

77 *Vigil*: Vol 4 No. 52 Study Feb. 13, 1953 p. 5.

78 *J&K Chronicle* (Magazine) Feb. 1976 pp 10-12 B P. harmas' rticle "New light on Sheikh Abdullah's Arrest" published by Sh. B. P. Sharma. Mohall Narayanan, Jammu

79 *The Times of India* Bombay ugust 10th 1953.

80 Bird-Wood Lord : *Two Nations in Kashmir* op. cit, p. 158.

81 *J&K Chronical* (Magazine) op.cit. pp. 10-12.

82 Teng, Krishan Mohan : *Kashmir's Special Status* Oriental Pub. Delhi-1975, p-71

83 *A Study of Communist Movement in Kashmir*, Jyoti Prakashan, Gaziabad, year un known



